There is great value in developing a fearsome reputation. The reasons for such a reputation may be for any number of things: you are stubborn, difficult, violent, ruthlessly efficient.
The point of having such an element to your personality is to make people respect you, even fear you a little. Who will want to pick an argument with someone who will fight to the bitter end? Or one who is strategic yet ruthless?
To cultivate such an image you must every now and again play a little rough; not so much that it becomes a negative trait, but enough to become a deterrent for those who might consider crossing you.
A Frightening Reputation
During the early 50s, John Boyd served with distinction in the Korean War. By the middle of the decade he was a respected flight instructor at the Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.
So good was he that he was asked to develop a new manual on fighter pilot tactics. During practice dogfights, he had demonstrated a new method that sought to terrorize and demoralize and get into his opponent’s head.
Despite being almost unbeatable in these dogfights, nothing could prepare him for the backstabbing and political manoeuvring at the Pentagon where he was assigned in 1966 to help design lightweight jet fighters.
Boyd soon discovered that upholding national defence was only of secondary importance to the Pentagon bureaucrats. First and foremost came their careers.
Rather than developing better and faster fighter jets, they were content with satisfying contractors by buying any new technology on the market, irrespective of suitability. Luckily, as a pilot, Colonel Boyd had become accustomed to viewing every situation as a strategic combat of sorts; now he would have to apply such thinking to the jungle that was the Pentagon.
He would do all it took, be it intimidating, outsmarting, or outmanoeuvring his opponents, in order to achieve his goal. Boyd believed that his design of a streamlined jet fighter would become the best of its kind. But the contractors hated it – it failed to highlight the technologies they were pedalling and, even worse, it was too inexpensive which meant less profits for them.
And for their part, Boyd’s fellow bureaucrats each had their own pet projects and were competing for the same pot of money. Thus they did everything they could to disrupt and change his plans.
Boyd developed a way of dealing with them all. He dressed shabbily, kept a wild look in his eyes, and smoked nasty cigars. To others he seemed like yet another emotional fighter pilot who had been promoted much too fast.
But when away from their gaze, he made sure to master every detail. He knew all the necessary engineering theories, statistics, and studies. Contractors showed up with their polished presentations designed to bamboozle the generals, given by their top engineers.
Boyd would patiently sit while they presented and even pretended to seem impressed. Once they were finished, he would go on the offensive, reveal their fakery, and tear them to shreds.
Each contractor would be blindsided by this man they underestimated, and each time they swore revenge, but what could they do? They had been caught out and had lost credibility. Rather than attempt to sabotage or confront him, soon both contractors and bureaucrats alike began to avoid him altogether and hope he would fail by himself.
It was in 1974 when Boyd and his team finally completed the design for the jet fighter they had been working on, and it seemed sure to be accepted. But word reached him, via a network of allies he had built up from across the Pentagon, that a group of three-star generals hated the plan and were going to scuttle the project.
They would let the project seem as though it got a fair hearing by letting Boyd brief the various levels of the chain of command, then put an end to it once it reached them. To Boyd this was unacceptable – so he went into action mode.
As well as his network of allies, Boyd also liked to keep a very powerful supporter. This was not particularly hard to find: plenty officials and generals were disgusted with the constant politicking in the Pentagon.
It was now that Boyd called upon his powerful backer – Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger. He quickly won Schlesinger’s personal approval for the project, then he went to the meeting with the generals.
The meeting began, and the generals were full of confidence. Inwardly, they were gloating. They finally had him.
Boyd stood up.
“Gentlemen, I am authorized by the secretary of defence to inform you that this is not a decision brief. This briefing is for informational purposes only.”
The project, he told them, had already been approved.
He began his presentation and made it as long as possible to twist the knife in them. Boyd wanted to send a clear message to the humiliated generals – never mess with him again.
As part of his strategic thinking, John Boyd always tried to surprise his opponent with a frightening manoeuvre. When a general gave an order that was clearly designed to sabotage his plans, for example, he would smile and say, “Sir, I’ll be happy to follow that order. But I want you to put it in writing.”
Generals tended to give verbal orders rather than creating a paper trail which could put them into trouble if something went wrong. Thus, Boyd knew that they would be forced to drop the order or deny his request. Either way, they were trapped and outmanoeuvred.
Over the years, people within the Pentagon learned to avoid Boyd like the plague. And it was the wide berth this gave him that allowed him to create and push through his designs for the F-15 and F-16, two of the most effective and famous fighter jets in air force history.
Analysis
John Boyd knew just how unpopular his project was at the Pentagon, and that he would meet much opposition and problems as he sought to pass it through. At the same time, he knew that he could not fight each bureaucrat and each contractor every single time he met an obstruction.
No; Boyd was wise enough to understand that doing so what exhaust him and make his project go down in flames. He was a consummate strategist, and, being a strategist, he knew that rather than hitting strength with strength, it was much more economical to find and attack weaknesses.
And a big, lumbering bureaucracy like the Pentagon would certainly have weaknesses to exploit so long as he could find them. For one, the people in the Pentagon wanted to be liked, they carefully looked after their reputations and were essentially political people.
Boyd did the opposite of this, he made sure he gained a reputation for being nasty, and that people who crossed him often lost their credibility, reputation, and wasted their time. In essence, he became a porcupine; no matter how small it is, not even the largest animals dare to deal with it – the damage isn’t worth it.
This gave Boyd staying power, and enough time and space to shepherd his projects through. Reputation, Boyd knew, was the key.
Your reputation, my dear reader, may not be particularly intimidating. This is understandable since we all want to fit in, play nice, be accommodating, etc.
Usually this works well, but there will be moments where this will work against you: it tells people that you can be cajoled, disrupted, obstructed. That is why there is utility in having a reputation for be something of a fighter.
If annoyed, you will make life difficult for them. If attacked, you’ll hit them right back. You need not exhibit this side of yourself always. A few spectacular demonstrations will suffice.
Once people see you as someone not to be trifled with, they will think twice. It is as Machiavelli once said, that it is more useful to be feared than to be loved if you cannot be both.
Footnotes & Further Reading
Greene, Robert. The 33 Strategies of War. Millionaire, 2006
