After the death of the Sun King Louis XIV in 1715, the political, military, and economic current of Europe was for a while geared towards peace, and a general hesitation to enter another war.
This was the case for the next two decades.
France particularly needed time to recover after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) had bankrupted the state, dent its foreign commerce, and left it with crippling debt.
Additionally, the monarchies of both France and Britain were uneasy over their own successions, and so frowned upon any attempts to upset the status quo.
Thus, they instead soon found it mutually beneficial to cooperate on many issues.
In 1719, for example, this fact was demonstrated when both teamed up to prevent Spain from expanding in Italy.
But by 1730, the tide of international relations was again beginning to shift… a shift that would culminate in the Seven Years’ War.
Growing French Ambitions
By then the French were no longer quite so content with their ties to Britain and instead began looking to recover their position as the leading nation in Europe.
The French succession was secure, and the years of peace had helped create property, with a large expansion in maritime trade to boot, which even started challenging other maritime powers such as the British and the Dutch.
Buoyed by this favorable momentum, the French began quickly improving relations with the Spaniards and ramped up its diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, Britain was endeavoring to keep out of continental affairs by adopting a cautious and isolationist policy under its first Prime Minister, Robert Walpole.
So, even when France attacked the Austrian possessions of Lorraine and Milan in 1733, and the French entry into the Rhineland, Britain still did not budge from its position.
And when they found no help from the isolationist Walpole nor the now-terrified Dutch, Austria begrudgingly negotiated a peace compromise with Paris in 1738.
France, now emboldened by its military and diplomatic successes, by its brand-new alliance with Spain, and by the increasing compliance of the Dutch, Austria, and even Sweden, France was now rivaling the prestige it had under the reign of King Louis XIV.
Its prestige was only further bolstered when French diplomacy negotiated an end to the Austro-Russian war against the Ottomans, which led to the return to Ottoman possession of much of the territory the two had seized.
Anglo-Spanish Tensions and the War of the Austrian Succession
Yet, although Walpole was less inclined to pay attention, opposition politicians and commercial interests could not ignore the rising amount of clashes with French-backed Spain in the Americas.
The reason for this was that the rich colonial lands and the overlapping settler claims offered much to quarrel over.
Soon though, this led to the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-48) which Walpole, reluctantly, agreed to in October 1739.
Now, this would have remained one of the smaller conflicts of this period, had the French not decided to give the Spanish all sorts of aid.
Unlike in the War of Spanish Succession, this time the two were in a far better position to compete overseas, especially since Britain could not yet undertake the conquest of Spanish Americas so favored by many at home.
The situation was further complicated when Emperor Charles VI succumbed to a small case of death and was replaced by Maria Theresa.
It was then only complicated even further by Frederick the Great’s decision to take advantage of the situation and conquer Silesia for Prussia in the winter of 1740-1.
The French, now simply unable to contain their glee at the prospect of the hated Austrians being punished, quickly pledged support for Prussia in their efforts, which pushed Austria into allying with Britain.
This gave much help to the hard-pressed Maria Theresa in the form of subsidies from the British.
Not only this, but they also managed to use diplomacy to take both Prussia (for now) and Saxony out of the war.
Additionally, they launched military operations at Dettingen in 1743.
These measures all had the effect of relieving Austria, and protecting Hanover (who had the same king as Britain), whilst also removing French influence from Germany.
Until now, there was little direct confrontation between Britain and France, yet these movements turned the friction between the two into open and direct hostilities.
When this happened, the Royal Navy, facing no significant challenge from the Franco-Spanish forces at sea, yet again quickly blockaded French commerce.
Elsewhere, the series of moves and countermoves continued, whether in the West Indies, around Madras or along trade routes to the Levant.
And the war was getting extremely expensive, with Britain continuing to bribe Prussia from joining the war, whilst simultaneously also propping up Austria, and also purchasing mercenaries as well.
But fortunately for them, it was the French coffers that were exhausted first, which forced them to the negotiating table.
It was financial, as well as geographical constraints which forced the two to towards peace talks, which led to the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).
This treaty saw the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48).
Motivations for the Peace
Interestingly, this was despite the fact that the French had the Dutch at their mercy by then and were generally doing very well on land.
But they likely acknowledged that it wouldn’t compensate for the loss of their maritime trade or of their foreign colonies.
As for Britain, what use was their naval victories if the Low Countries were lost to the French?
As a result, the treaty brought a return to the pre-war status quo, except for the notable change of Silesia moving permanently into Frederick’s hands.
Run-Up to the Seven Years’ War
The treaty thus left Maria Theresa thirsting for revenge, the French wondering how to counter British naval supremacy, and Britain likewise wondering how to counter the French more effectively on land.
However, in the North American colonies of France and Britain, it seemed that even the words ‘peace’ or ‘treaty’ held no weight there whatsoever.
Frequent were the clashes between their respective group of settlers, and the armed forces there were almost impossible to control by their home governments.
And in each country, there existed a lobby that promoted the views of the settlers and also encouraged the view that soon a showdown was to take place between the two.
So, with each side sending more troops to their American colonies, and each navy ready for war by 1755, it seemed another Anglo-French war was soon to be underway.
The Diplomatic Revolution of 1756
These developments left important questions being asked in many European capitals.
For the Spanish and Dutch, who were by now in the second rank of European powers, the only way to hopefully not get caught in the crossfire between the two was through neutrality in the coming conflict.
As for the eastern monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia neutrality was not an option.
It was virtually impossible for them to not get involved in any Anglo-French War.
And there were three reasons for this.
The first is should the French wish to attack the British, the obvious first target would be Hanover, which served as the British Achilles heel.
And to prevent this from happening, the British would be looking to bring other countries into the war in order to check the French advance.
Second is that the Austrians were determined to recover Silesia and were ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, whilst the Czarina Elizabeth of Russia positively hated the ambitious Frederick.
And Frederick, for his part, was looking for more ways to conquer the lands of his neighbors.
As a result, were the Prussians to join one of the sides, the others would quickly join the other to punish Frederick.
The third is more straightforward – each of their armies was simply too huge for countries not looking to enter a major war.
Bearing in mind that all were dependent on British and France subsidies to keep their armies at this size, here’s a quick rundown of the numbers:
- Prussia – 150,000+
- Austria – approx. 200,000
- Russia – approx. 330,000
So, when looked at this way, the famous ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ of 1756 starts looking like a mere reshuffling of the cards, and another European case of shifting alliances.
France joined with the Austrians and the Russians, and the British ditched Vienna for the more successful Prussians.
War Breaks Out
When the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) finally broke out in May 1756, it seemed the Franco-Austro-Russian alliance was the bigger deal, especially militarily.
This was backed up when by 1757 Frederick had lost all the lands he had gained previously, and an Anglo-German army under the Duke of Cumberland had surrendered.
The French had taken Minorca, and in the Americas, France was winning also.
The future seemed pretty bleak for the Anglo-Prussian alliance, and for the French and the Austrians, overturning the Treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle was starting to become a very real possibility.
But this did not happen.
Why?
Anglo-Prussian Strengths
Well you see, it turns out that the Anglo-Prussian alliance was stronger than their enemy in three distinct areas – leadership, finance, and military/naval expertise.
On the leadership front, there is no doubt as to Frederick the Great’s ability to harness the full potential of Prussia towards the pursuit of victory.
He was a ‘warrior-king’ in every respect and thoroughly deserved his epithet ‘the Great’.
But the first prize should go nonetheless to William Pitt the Elder, who, unlike Frederick, was not an absolute monarch, and instead had to contend with several jealous politicians in parliament.
Additionally, he had to assuage a volatile public, compromise with a new king, and still find a way to defeat the French.
The secret, he realized, was to complement Britain’s strong suit – its maritime power – with an effective continental strategy.
This involved sending huge subsidies to Prussia, whilst paying for an ‘Army of Observation’ in Germany to protect Hanover and contain the French.
And that moves us onto the second point after leadership – finances.
Such a policy needed a great amount of financial endurance to be able to cope with these expenses year after year during the war.
And although the Prussians used every trick in the book to raise as much money as they could, their revenue was pitiful compared to the amount the British brought to the table.
In fact, the Seven Years’ War cost Britain £160 million, of which £60 million was loaned.
This was a staggeringly eyewatering sum for the time.
Yet, whilst the opposition in Britain balked at the sum, overseas trade continued increasing year on year, bringing prosperity to the country even whilst in the middle of a war.
This is actually an excellent example of how Britain used its sea power to not only wage war, but also increase trade and prosperity at the same time.
And it was precisely because of this prudent planning that Britain possessed vastly greater amounts of financial stamina in wars compared to their continental rivals.
This notion was explained in a brief to the British ambassador to Prussia succinctly:
“We must be merchants before we are soldiers…trade and maritime force depend upon each other.”
On the other hand, in complete and stark contrast, all the other combatants suffered a very heavy financial toll as a result of this war.
As for military and naval expertise, this also showed itself in good time, despite the early setbacks.
An enormous blockage of all of France’s Atlantic ports by the Royal Navy was already underway, whether in France itself or in its colonies.
Not only did this throttle French maritime trade, it had the effect of preventing France from sending more reinforcement to its colonial territories, whilst also protecting Britain’s own commerce and territorial integrity.
It was thus unsurprising that soon France started losing colonial territories left and right to the British.
This complemented the success of the Anglo-German army commanded by the Prussians at Minden after defeating two French armies there.
And when the Spanish foolishly joined in 1762, they also lost their colonies in the Caribbean as well as the Philippines to the British.
As for the Prussians, they also had their fair share of successes.
Not only did Frederick demolish a French and an Austrian army at Rossbach and Leuthen respectively, but he also halted their eagerness to move into northern Germany in consequence.
And after being defeated again both at Liegnitz and Torgau in 1760, the Austrians were left bankrupt.
Status Quo Ante Bellum
Nevertheless, the war was starting to take a toll on the Prussians, especially when the Russians proved much more formidable than expected.
In fact, at one point, the Prussians were cornered by the Russians but were saved at the eleventh hour by Czarina Elizabeth’s death in 1762.
And once Czar Peter swiftly withdrew from the war, peace settlements brought the continent back to its pre-war status quo once again for the most part – which spelled failure for those wanting to bring Prussia and the British down.
The 1762-3 settlements had but one obvious beneficiary.
And that was Great Britain.
Even though they agreed to return various captured territories to both France and Spain, they still made advances in the West Indies, and also in West Africa.
Additionally, they were now the pre-eminent power in North America and had wiped away French influence from India.
Just with these gains, they had attained territories with far greater potential for wealth than areas its continental rivals fought so bitterly over such as Silesia or Lorraine.
Moreover, it once again checked France’s ambitions in the continent and maintained the general balance of power in Europe.
As for France, not only did it lose disastrously overseas, but it also lost in Europe – which hadn’t happened in 1748.
So badly they had lost, that the center of gravity within the continent shifted from West to East.
This was demonstrated through the general disregard of France’s wishes later on during the First Partition of Poland in 1772.
Natural, this all nicely suited the British who were thoroughly pleased with how the whole affair had turned out.
But that is not to say their streak of success would go on forever.
Footnotes & Further Reading
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000. London: William Collins, 2017.
